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Abstract 
For a given set of labor market institutions, the rate of frictional unemployment depends on the evolution of the pool 
of job-seekers. Unemployment rises with the growth rate of labor supply that is proportionate to the rate of population 
growth. If economic growth is semi-endogenous, the steady-state growth rate depends positively on the rate of 
population growth. This suggests a trade-off between growth and unemployment: a faster growing economy has a 
higher unemployment rate. As a consequence, faster growth may not be desirable from a welfare point of view. We 
make this point in a parsimonious setting where semi-endogenous growth derives from the division of labor and the 
associated gains from specialization.
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     1 Introduction
Frictional unemployment involves people being temporarily between jobs. The duration of
such spells of unemployment depends on the institutional framework of the labor market.
Examples of such institutions abound. Agencies providing information to job-seekers and
employers tend to reduce the length of unemployment spells. The way the unemployment
insurance pays its benets may aect workers' eort devoted to job search. Job protection
laws impinge on the choosiness of employers (see, e.g., Layard, Nickell, and Jackman
(2005), Chapters 4-6, for details).
This paper argues that the quality of these institutions may determine whether an
economy faces a trade-o between unemployment and economic growth. We make this
point in a parsimonious semi-endogenous growth model, where unemployment and eco-
nomic growth are endogenous. Hence, factors that aect economic growth may also aect
the rate of unemployment.
The notion of semi-endogenous growth refers to a class of endogenous growth models
with the property that the \long-run growth rate is not endogenous, (...), in the sense
that traditional policy changes have long-run growth eects" (Jones (1995), p.760-761).
Besides technological parameters it is the rate of population growth that determines the
steady-state growth rate of an economy. In the economy under scrutiny here economic
growth is not R&D-based as in Jones (1995) but due to gains from specialization associated
with the division of labor in a growing economy.
In the labor market, it is the duration of an average unemployment spell that reects
the quality of the institutional framework in which the labor market operates. The evo-
lution of the pool of job-seekers determines the rate of frictional unemployment. Let this
pool consist of the currently unemployed, i.e., the dierence between the aggregate labor
supply and the currently employed workforce. The growth rates of aggregate labor supply
and of employment determine whether the unemployment rate increases or decreases. In a
steady state these growth rates coincide. The steady-state unemployment rate is constant
and higher the faster labor supply grows.
Both concepts suggest a trade-o between growth and unemployment. On the one
hand, frictional unemployment increases if population, thus labor supply, grows faster. On
the other hand, economic growth increases in the population growth rate. Thus, a faster
growing economy has a higher unemployment rate. This trade-o hinges on the presence
of labor market frictions. In a perfectly competitive labor market, it can, by denition,
not arise. However, consistent with the ndings described by Nickell and Layard (1999),
these institutional frictions increase unemployment but leave the economy's growth rate
unaected.
Our results are based on the characterization of the global dynamics of the economy.
This allows us to establish that the trade-o between growth and unemployment arises
not only in the steady state but also along the transition towards it. Moreover, we analyze
the implications of this trade-o for welfare. We nd that faster economic growth reduces
welfare if the eect of labor market frictions is suciently pronounced.
The literature on the relationship between economic growth and unemployment dates
at least back to the works of Riccardo (1821) and Marx (1867). The more recent con-
tributions have used elements of the so-called endogenous growth theory to shed new
light on this relationship. For instance, Pissarides (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1994),
or Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) emphasize that a trade-o between growth and un-
employment may result from opposing incentives faced by rms to create and destroy
1jobs. Daveri and Tabelini (2000) or Irmen and Wigger (2003) stress the role of unem-
ployment for aggregate savings and capital accumulation for such a trade-o. Irmen and
Wigger (2006) extends this line of reasoning to an open economy. Labor market frictions
may also give rise to a growth-unemployment trade-o if international trade requires the
reallocation of workers. This has been shown by Arnold (2002) for an economy facing
North-South trade in the spirit of Helpman (1993).
Unlike these studies, the present paper considers an environment in which the la-
bor force is allowed to grow. Then, the growth-unemployment trade-o arises since a
semi-endogenous increase in the growth rate also increases the unemployment rate in the
presence of labor market frictions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section
2. Section 3 studies the equilibrium and derives our main result: the trade-o between
growth and unemployment is not restricted to the steady state but occurs also along the
transition. Section 4 derives the welfare implications. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a closed economy comprising a nal-good sector, an intermediate-good sector,
and a household sector. Time is continuous, i.e., t 2 [0;1). In all periods there is a
market for the consumption good, for all available varieties of the intermediate good, and
for labor. The nal good serves as num eraire. To simplify the notation we omit the time
argument except where it is needed for clarity.
The Final-Good Sector There are many competitive rms producing a homoge-
neous good under constant returns to scale. We may therefore describe the nal-good











; 0 <  < 1;; (1)
where Y is output at t, x(j) is the amount of intermediate j used at t, and A 2 R+ is
the measure of varieties of intermediates available at t. The parameter  determines the
elasticity of substitution between any pair of intermediates, "  1=(1   ). Following
Ethier (1982), the term in front of the integral introduces  2 (0;1) as a measure of
gains from specialization. If  = 0, these gains vanish.














the minimum cost of one unit of Y . Then, the cost function is P Y and with (2) we
obtain the conditional factor demands for each intermediate good from an application of










 " for all j 2 [0;A]: (3)
2The Intermediate-Good Sector Each variant of the intermediate good is produced
according to the production function
x(j) = max

0;l(j)    l
	
; (4)
here l(j) is the total amount of labor employed by rm j, and  l > 0 denotes the amount
of quasi-xed labor.
There is free entry into the production of each variety. The quasi-xed wage cost
implies that the equilibrium has only one manufacturer of each variety earning zero prots.
With w denoting the real wage, the per-period prot of the manufacturer of variety j is
 (j) = (p(j)   w)x(j)   w l: (5)
In view of (3), the prot-maximizing price is




and implies that x(j) = x. The zero-prot condition
(p   w)x = w l (7)







The Household Sector The household sector at t comprises N identical work-
ers/consumers. Each worker has a per-period labor endowment equal to one. Labor
is inelastically supplied in exchange for wages. Aggregate labor supply at t is
N(t) = N0e
gNt; (9)
where N0 > 0 is the initial value and gN > 0 denotes the population growth rate.
The labor market is not innitely exible. While workers oer their time endowment
they may not immediately nd rms willing to hire them at the equilibrium real wage. We
refer to L as the level of employment at t. There is a probability,  dt, for an unemployed
to nd work in the short time interval dt. The parameter  2 (0;1) subsumes the
characteristics of the labor market alluded to in the introduction. The expected duration
of unemployment is 1= and `innite exibility' corresponds to the limit  ! 1. In other
words, the assumption is that
dL =  dt(N   L): (10)
Dividing by dt, the evolution of employment is given by the two dierential equations
_ L(t) =  (N(t)   L(t)) and _ N(t) = gN N(t) (11)
with 0 < L0 < N0 as initial values.
3There is a continuum [0;1] of identical, innitely-lived households to which workers








where c(t) is per-capita consumption,  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and  > gN is the instantaneous rate of time preference.
We assume that each household comprises many members such that the fraction of
unemployed household members coincides with the deterministic aggregate unemployment
rate. Hence, there is no uncertainty about household income.
We abstract from means to transfer resources between periods.1 Moreover, there is no







Given L0, N0, and the evolution of labor supply (9), the equilibrium determines an al-
location, i.e., a sequence fY (t);A(t);x(j;t);l(j;t);c(t);L(t)g1
t=0, and a price system, i.e.,
a sequence fp(j;t);w(j;t)g1
t=0, that satisfy for all t conditions (3), (6), and (7) for the
production sector, condition (13) for the household sector, and the equilibrium conditions
of all markets, where (11) governs the evolution of the level of employment.
Consider the labor market. The aggregate demand for labor A(x +  l) adjusts to L,






Thus, the division of labor is determined by the degree of substitutability of intermediates,
, the quasi-xed costs,  l, and the level of employment, L, which represents the extend
of the market.






where   
 
(1   )= l
((1=) 1) > 0 is a time-invariant parameter. From Euler's Law









1This assumption is innocuous for the existence of a growth-unemployment trade-o in equilibrium.
One way to introduce productive capital into aggregate production is to replace (1) by  Y = K Y 1 ,

















Before we turn to the characterization of the evolution of per-capita consumption we
need to study the evolution of unemployment.












According to Proposition 1, the employment rate converges to a steady-state value for







Intuitively, a rise in  reduces the duration of unemployment and leads to a lower steady-
state unemployment rate. Faster population growth accentuates existing frictions and













1. There is a unique equilibrium path of per-capita consumption given by




























5According to Proposition 2, the equilibrium path of per-capita consumption converges
for all admissible initial conditions. Moreover, the economy exhibits semi-endogenous
growth in the sense that steady-state growth depends on three exogenous parameters:
gains from specialization since  > 0, the degree of product dierentiation  2 (0;1),
and the population growth rate gN > 0. Intuitively,  > 0 and  2 (0;1) imply that the
reduced form production function (15) has \increasing returns to scale", i.e., it is strictly
convex in L. Therefore, growth becomes feasible under a strictly positive population
growth rate.
A comparison of (20) and (24) reveals a trade-o between the growth rate of per-
capita magnitudes and the rate of unemployment in the steady state. A higher population
growth rate means faster economic growth and a higher unemployment rate. The following
proposition strengthens this result. It shows that the trade-o between economic growth
and unemployment is not conned to the steady-state.
Proposition 3 Denote g(t) the equilibrium path of the growth rate of per-capita






> 0 for all t  tc. (25)
Hence, along the transition towards the steady state there is a nite critical tc such
that the economy faces a trade-o between growth and unemployment once this period
is reached: a permanent rise in the population growth rate that occurs at some t  tc
accelerates economic growth at the cost of a higher unemployment rate in all later periods.
To understand the intuition for this nding consider rst the path of the unemployment
rate as given by (18). A rise in gN aects u(t) in three ways. First, the unemployment
rate rises since a rise in the growth rate of the labor supply increases the steady-state
unemployment rate u. Second and related, a higher u aects the distance between the
initial level and the steady state u   u0. Third, the (asymptotic) speed of convergence
increases.2 The point of Proposition 3 is that the rst eect dominates if the economy is
suciently far away from its starting point.3
To grasp the eect of a rise in gN on per-capita consumption growth consider the
instantaneous growth rate (t) of (23) and (17). Then, there are two eects to be consid-
ered. First, there is a negative direct eect through population growth. Second, there is
an indirect eect on the growth rate of aggregate output that depends on the growth rate
of the employed work force. In accordance with (11), gL is larger when the unemployment
rate is high. Moreover, from the preceding paragraph we know that an increase in gN
must eventually augment the unemployment rate. Then, the point of Proposition 3 is
that along its transition the economy reaches a critical period tg
c in nite time such that
the indirect eect dominates the direct eect for all t  tg
c < 1. Observe that this nding
needs growth through gains from specialization. Otherwise the trade-o between growth
and unemployment vanishes in the steady state.
2The speed of convergence is dened as  @(_ u=u)=@ lnu. Evaluated at u gives the asymptotic speed
of convergence equal to  + gN.
3From the proof of Proposition 3 we also learn that @u(t)=@gN > 0 holds for all t > 0 if u > u0. On
the other hand, for u0 > u and some nite period tu
c, it is possible to have @u(t)=@gN < 0 whenever






=t and t < tu
c.
64 Welfare Considerations
Since faster growth per se is not an end in itself, the question arises whether the trade-o
between unemployment and growth has implications for welfare. To address this question,
we focus on the steady state, i.e., all per-capita magnitudes grow at rate g of (24) for













Since the unemployment rate is pegged at u of (19), the steady-state initial values L0
and N0 are no longer independent but satisfy L0 = N0=( + gN). As a consequence, we













Then, a rise in gN has the following eects on U. First, there is a trade-o inside the
brackets reecting a level eect on c(0) and a growth eect through g. Faster population
growth means a rise in the unemployment rate and c(0) declines; it also implies a rise
in the steady-state growth rate. Second, a trade-o may or may not arise if we consider
the eect on the eective discount rate in front of the bracketed term. The following
proposition shows that clear-cut results are available for a neighborhood where  = 1 and
gN = 0.
Proposition 4 Let lim!1 c(0)  1. Then, there is
   
0















A 2 (0;1): (28)






R 0 ,  R  : (29)
Roughly speaking, Proposition 4 establishes that the overall eect of faster population
growth on welfare depends on the labor market's ability to accommodate change. If this
ability is high such that  >   then faster economic growth increases welfare. Intuitively,
the labor market integrates a faster growing labor supply without a signicant increase
in the unemployment rate. As a result the level eect on c(0) is dominated by the eects
on g and on the eective discount rate.4 Since the latter two eects are positive and
independent of labor market frictions whereas the level eect on c(0) vanishes in the
limit  ! 1, the economy under full employment unambiguously benets from faster
population growth.
Observe that the results of Proposition 4 apply to a suciently small neighborhood
of (;gN) = (1;0). However, the focus on this neighborhood is less restrictive than it
might appear at rst sight. For instance, Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) argue
that there is no strong evidence against  close to one.5 Moreover, the vicinity of gN = 0
is consistent with recent evidence suggesting that the current and expected population
growth rates in many industrialized countries rates are close to zero (see, e.g., Kr uger
and Ludwig (2007) for a discussion).




0  1 assures that the eect of gN on U through the






5Many calibration studies stipulate a utility function with  = 1. See, e.g., Heer and Maussner (2008)
for an elaborate discussion of computable general equilibrium models and their calibration.
75 Concluding Remarks
A trade-o between economic growth and unemployment may arise when labor-market
frictions are present and gains from specialization give rise to semi-endogenous economic
growth. Intuitively, labor market frictions reduce the ability of the labor market to absorb
a growing supply of labor and give rise to a higher unemployment rate. However, semi-
endogenous growth is higher the faster the supply of labor grows.
We also establish that the trade-o between unemployment and growth has impli-
cations for the desirability of faster growth from a welfare point of view. Intuitively,
since faster economic growth increases the unemployment rate, a larger fraction of the
population does not benet from economic growth. In the presence of a representative
household, this reduces welfare if labor market frictions are strong.
These results restate that faster economic growth generates winners and losers. To
identify them, one would need to extend our parsimonious analytical framework. For
instance, one could replace the assumption of identical households with household hetero-
geneity in the spirit of Caselli and Ventura (2000). As long as economic growth remains
semi-endogenous traditional policies will not have long-run growth eects. However, the
question arises whether government interventions can be justied aiming at an enlarge-
ment of the fraction of the population that benets from economic growth. We leave such
extensions for future research.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Denote   L=N the employment rate at t. From the denition of  and the evolution of
the level of employment (11) it follows that _  =  ( + gN) . This is a linear, rst-order
dierential equation with constant coecient that can be solved. The particular solution
for some 0 < 1 is (t) =  +(0   )e (+gN)t, where  = limt!1 (t) = =( +gN).
Proposition 1 follows from the denition of u. 
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2














Then, with (17), the evolution of c(t) can be written as

















8Equation (31) is a linear, rst-order dierential equation with variable coecient that can
be solved. Equation (22) is the particular solution for a given initial condition c(0) = c0.
In accordance with (16), we have c0 = L
1+(1= 1)
0 =N0.

























































Hence, in the limit t ! 1, per-capita consumption grows at the rate given in (24). From
(15), it is obvious that this growth rate also applies to per-capita output.
Condition (21) assures that the utility, U of (12), is nite in the limit. 
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3















Since limt!1 @u(t)=@gN = @u=@gN > 0, there must be tu
c < 1 with the property that
@u(t)=@gN > 0 for all t  tu
c.


































































Hence, there must be tg




cg Proposition 3 holds. 
96.4 Proof of Proposition 4
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 + gN)(   gN   (1   )g)
+
@g
@gN(   gN) + g
(   gN)
2 (   gN   (1   )g)
: (36)
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R 0 ,  R 
0















A   : (40)





Hence,   2 (0;1). 
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